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1. Introduction
“...it follows that we should not regard the organism or the individual (not to speak of the species) as the ultimate element of the
biological system. Rather it should be the organism or the individual at a particular point of time, or even better, during a certain,
theoretically infinitely small, period of its life. We will call this element of all biological systematics... the character-bearing
semaphoront.”—W. Hennig [1: p6, emphasis original]
Definitions offer meanings of words by way of associations with other terms [2, 3]. Accord‐
ingly, a definition relates a concept to a name [4]. Like any field of science, precision of
communication in biology is dependent upon the use of terms, while actions taken as conse‐
quences of the acceptance of those terms are constrained by definitions. The importance of the
meanings of words is especially critical when actions in one subfield of biology are dependent
on terms developed in other subfields. A case in point involves the terms species, biodiversity,
and conservation. With a voluminous literature regarding what species are supposed to be, the
topic has suffered from an overemphasis on ‘species concepts’ that are largely detached from
more inclusive biological systematics principles (e.g. [5]) required to answer the question
‘What is a species?’ While upwards of 26 species ‘concepts’ are recognized [6‒8], there is
inconsistency among these in that they either refer to causal or acausal constructs. Causal
characterizations typically present species as entities involved in past events, whereas acausal
accounts refer to differentially shared features of organisms. Wilkins [8: p58, emphasis
original] refers to causal-based concepts as indicating “what species are,” and acausal concepts
as “how we identify species.” The implication of either perspective leans toward species being
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entities that can be perceived by way of their properties, yet too often species and the organisms
to which they refer are conflated (cf. [9]).
Settling the matter of what species are and the definition of the term requires a perspective
that goes beyond the traditional, inordinately narrow consideration of just species. In ac‐
knowledging that species are taxa, we first must consider the formal definition of taxon. By
extension, the definition of taxon must be consistent with the goal of biological systematics,
and that goal must be accordant with that of scientific inquiry. The perspective regarding
species, as with all taxa, must be reflective of scientific practice in not only systematics but also
other fields in biology. For instance, we too often neglect to acknowledge that because
evolutionary biology is foundational to systematics, taxa are not class constructs, but rather
the products of discreet inferential actions intended to impart causal understanding, e.g. the
inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses—as cladograms—from observations of differentially
distributed organismal characters. Systematics deals with systematization, not classification
[10‒14]. As will be shown in this chapter, the scope of taxa extends to a number of types of
biological phenomena involving organisms that are not routinely recognized by our formal
nomenclatural systems, i.e. the International Codes of Nomenclature (e.g. [15]) or the PhyloCode
[16]. The challenge is to place species into the more inclusive context of taxa. In doing so, we
have an opportunity to not only formally define the term species such that it is concordant with
the definition of taxon, but also acknowledge that the one term species has taken on a respon‐
sibility beyond its means in service of scientific inquiry.
In parallel with the significance and difficulties associated with the terms species and taxon,
biologists have yet to settle the matter of defining biodiversity. Consider the following charac‐
terizations: “the collection of genomes, species, and ecosystems occurring in a geographically
defined region” [17; see also 18‒21; but see 22 for alternative opinions]; “the number of species
observed or estimated to occur in an area (species richness)... This results from widespread
recognition of the significance of the species as a biological unit...” [23: p220; see also 24‒27];
“variation at all levels of biological organization” [28: p3; see also 29]; or “the variability among
living organisms from all sources including… terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems
and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species,
between species and of ecosystems” [30: p89; 31: p13, 109]. While biodiversity encompasses
notions of spatial and temporal variation, the currency of that variation remains unsettled,
ranging from the properties of organisms to taxa, but with species being the most popular
subject [9, 32]. The definitional ambiguities regarding species and biodiversity carry with them
potential negative epistemic and operational implications in fields as diverse as systematics,
evolutionary biology, ecology, and conservation.
The vagaries of defining biodiversity stem in large part from the lack of consensus among
systematists as to the definition of species, much less the more inclusive term taxon (e.g. [7,
33‒36]). Thus, justifying actions under the guise of conservation will remain ambiguous per
the largely arbitrary focus on the one taxon, species. As will be shown in this chapter, settling
the matter of how to characterize biodiversity and conservation requires acknowledging the
transitive relations between taxa, biodiversity, and conservation: {(taxa, biodiversity), (biodi‐
versity, conservation), (taxa, conservation)}. These relations manifest themselves as follows:
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biodiversity must be determined in the context of taxa; biodiversity determines the limits on
conservation; taxa determine the realization of conservation. Regarding species, these relations
have the added benefit of emphasizing the relevance of formal definitions of biodiversity and
conservation to a formal definition of species that is consistent with biological systematics
practice. These definitions follow from the fact that they reflect the inferential products of our
observations of organisms. There is the added consequence of recognizing that the one term
species cannot accommodate the variety of causal events to which it has been associated and
also be cogently defined. The time has come to begin giving serious consideration to a more
scientifically and operationally reasonable parsing of ‘species’ with new sets of terms that
accurately convey a variety of non-comparable causal events.
Pursuant to the transitive relations outlined above, this chapter will pursue three interrelated
issues. The first is to present a solution regarding the role of taxa when speaking of systematics,
biodiversity, and conservation. This entails identifying the objects that cause our perceptual
beliefs, i.e. individual organisms, and the inferential relations of objects/beliefs to the variety
of explanatory hypotheses referred to as taxa. It is then a straightforward matter to show that
species, as a taxon, is but one of the classes of hypotheses used in the pursuit of causal
understanding in systematics. This offers an advance toward defining the term species as
developed by Fitzhugh [12‒14, 37] and recognizing the inherent limits of that definition and
the need for additional terms.
If the objects from which our perceptual beliefs are derived in the biological sciences are indi‐
vidual organisms (more properly ‘semaphoronts’ sensu [1]; cf. quote above Introduction), not
species or other taxa, then we need to assess whether or not genes, species, ecosystems, etc., can
be regarded as ‘units’ or ‘entities’ to which biodiversity and conservation refer. The second goal
of this chapter is to present a formal, operational definition of biodiversity that is not only con‐
sistent with conservation, but also the nature of taxa as explanatory hypotheses. From a system‐
atics perspective, biodiversity cannot be construed in terms of genes, specific/phylogenetic
taxa, or ecosystems, but rather in the context of past, proximate tokogenetic (reproductive)
events related to groups of organisms that exist in the present. The restriction imposed is one di‐
rectly related to the objects and events that conservation attempts to conserve: circumscribed
tokogenetic events into the future – not species, not taxa. When referring to biodiversity, one can
argue that population- or intraspecific-level variation/polymorphism, inclusive of smaller-
scale heterogeneity (e.g. ‘distinct population segments’ [38]; ‘evolutionarily significant units’
[39‒42]; ‘designatable units’ [43]) can be considered along with specific- and supraspecific-lev‐
el (i.e. phylogenetic) hypotheses. The only roles population-, intraspecific-, specific-, or phylo‐
genetic-level taxa have to play in this regard is in the capacity of surrogates for denoting
inferred, temporally proximate systems of past tokogeny. Taxa, including species, are inferen‐
tial products functioning to provide causal understanding of what is perceived of observed or‐
ganisms, thus taxa are not objects to which biodiversity can directly apply. The subjects to
which biodiversity refer are, instead, individual organisms that exist in the present – not spe‐
cies, genomes (which, while a functional term, refer to parts of organisms), or ecosystems (the
interactions of organisms with their surroundings as well as other organisms). The reference to
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organisms in the context of biodiversity is operational only in the sense of maintaining geo‐
graphically circumscribed sets of tokogenetic events into the future, i.e. conservation.
In speaking of maintaining future tokogeny in reference to biodiversity, the third goal of this
chapter will be a formal, operational definition of conservation. This will entail the view that
conservation is an activity focused on future tokogeny among or between individuals, not the
maintenance of taxa, including species. It is individual organisms and their potential to
undergo future tokogeny that is the subject of conservation. The definition of conservation in
terms of individuals and potential tokogeny imposes limits not only on the definition of
biodiversity but also definitions of taxon and species. As conservation pertains to the mainte‐
nance of tokogenetic events among groups of individuals into the future, the subject of
biodiversity is also those groups of individuals. But in the case of biodiversity, taxa provide
the epistemic, as well as causal basis for delimiting those groups, upon which conservation
has a basis for implementation.
2. The nature of taxa
As indicated in the Introduction, definitions of taxon, biodiversity, and conservation are
interdependent by way of their transitive relations. For instance, a key element in discussions
of biodiversity and conservation has been species [9, 32, 44‒46], and sometimes by extension,
intra- and supraspecific taxa. Addressing the matter of defining biodiversity and conservation
cannot solely rely on presentation of a definition of species. The more general question, ‘what
are taxa?’, must first be addressed. Answering this question has significant consequences for
characterizations of biodiversity and conservation if taxa are to play any role, per their
transitive relations.
Definitions of taxon have taken two general approaches: (1) taxa are class constructs: e.g. “a
taxonomic group of any rank” [47: p9; 48‒59]; or (2) taxa are quasi-explanatory accounts, e.g.
“A taxon or taxonomic group… can mean only a group of organisms related genetically (or so
related to the best of our knowledge)…. It is a taxonomic group or assemblage of plants or
animals, having certain characteristics in common which we take as evidence of genetic
relationships, and possessed of some degree of objective reality” [60: p38; 15, 61, 62]. This class
versus explanation distinction is often ambiguous. It is not uncommon to see definitions of
taxon as a class construct yet also referred to in an evolutionary context, such that taxa must
be interpreted as explanatory vehicles. For instance, Kardong [63: p330] states, “A taxon is
simply a named group of organisms. A taxon may be a natural taxon, one that accurately
depicts a group that exists in nature resulting from evolutionary events. Or a taxon may be an
artificial taxon, one that does not correspond to an actual unit of evolution.” The causal
connotations associated with (2) have also taken on the form of considering taxa as natural
kinds, or ‘homeostatic property cluster kinds’ [64‒71].
In contrast to characterizations of taxa, discussions of species per se tend to consider three
alternatives. Species are (1) class constructs [48, 53, 72], (2) entities with the ontological status
of individuals [5, 35, 36, 70, 73‒90], or (3) natural kinds [64‒71, 88, 91‒95]. A fourth option is
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the view that species are ‘segments of lineages’ [16, 45, 94]. Discussions of individuality and
natural kinds, whether in regard to species or taxa as a whole, have degraded into little more
than rhetorical devices, e.g. [71, 88, 95, 96]. Considering species in the broader context of taxa,
arguments have been provided by Fitzhugh [10‒14, 37, 97, 98] outlining that neither the class
nor individuality thesis is appropriate to the issue (see [34] for extensive critiques), and the
lineage and natural kinds concepts are incomplete characterizations relative to the treatment
of taxa as explanatory hypotheses. Taxa are not mere classes, given that the goal of science is
not classification but rather systematization, i.e. the placement of objects into some theoretical
framework for the purpose of acquiring causal understanding [55, 99‒101; contra 93]. Taxa,
including species, cannot be conceived as individuals for the fact that there are no discernible
properties by which such ‘entities’ could be discovered, recognized, or described [102, 103].
While the lineage and natural kinds concepts approach the necessary explanatory tone, neither
has been sufficiently developed in terms of their inferential relations to the nature of other taxa
and the intersections with the objects that are our interest, i.e. organisms. What was proposed
by Fitzhugh [12, 13, 37; cf. 34 for a similar, independently derived perspective] is that as our
perceptions are caused by individual organisms, we naturally apply a variety of explanatory
hypotheses to those perceptions, and at least some of those hypotheses are formally repre‐
sented by names controlled by international bodies governing nomenclatural actions (e.g. [15];
cf. [104, 105] for examples of implementation in this context). Several classes of these hypoth‐
eses are shown in Figure 1, derived from Hennig [1: fig.6; see also 12: fig.1]. Note that what
are observed in the present are individual organisms (semaphoronts). Such perceptions are
possible because of the particular properties instantiated by those objects. An observation
statement is itself an explanatory account of one=s sense perceptions, where the causes of those
perceptions are the existence of objects [106]. Beyond our perceptual hypotheses are a variety
of other causal accounts that are routinely invoked to answer specifiable questions regarding
the properties of organisms. The relations between causal questions that might prompt
explanatory hypotheses of the types shown in Figure 1 and how they are communicated by
way of informal and formal names are presented in Table 1.
What is apparent is that species sensu lato, much less all taxa, are not the fundamental objects
or entities of which we speak when referring to observations (contra e.g. [9]). Indeed, as
outlined later, questions like “Are species real?” can be only answered by a very qualified ‘yes.’
Species are real to the extent that they, as well as all taxa, represent specifiable sets of past
causal events involving individual organisms, not for the fact that species/taxa are entities
(fide [9, 35, 107]). As well, the nature of inferences to species cannot entail the notion that the
relation between organismal characters and species is one of ‘diagnosis,’ or that diagnoses are
a matter of hypothesis testing (e.g. [108]).
The inferential derivation of all other taxa becomes even more apparent when we acknowledge
that the goal of biological systematics is (or should be, cf. [10, 12‒14, 98, 109]) consistent with
that of scientific inquiry [55, 110‒118]: to acquire ever-increasing descriptive and, more
importantly, causal understanding. Indeed, the view that systematics is not a process of
classification qua discerning and arranging classes via acausal ‘relationships’ (e.g. [57]) or
discovering metaphysical individuals (e.g. [85]), but instead an endeavor to pursue causal
Defining ‘Species,’ ‘Biodiversity,’ and ‘Conservation’ by Their Transitive Relations 5
understanding clearly extends from Darwin’s [119: chapter XIII] own views. Ghiselin [61: p87]
correctly notes that,
Figure 1. Relations between perceptual, ontogenetic, tokogenetic, intraspecific, specific (cf. Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘spe‐
cies2,’ ‘species4’) and phylogenetic hypotheses (adapted in part from [1: fig.6; 12: fig.1; 37: fig.1; 98: fig.1]). Those
classes of taxa that might be referred to in the context of biodiversity and conservation are marked with an asterisk
(*), i.e. intraspecific, specific, and phylogenetic.
“Systematics has scientific value as explanation, not as mere description. The purpose of
classification is not the accurate pigeonholing or identification of enzymes or dried specimens,
but the assertion of meaningful propositions about laws of nature and particular events.”
If taxa are explanatory hypotheses directed at our observations of organisms, then there are
two interesting consequences for biodiversity. The first is that species are not the exclusive
units or entities to be considered in the determination or communication of biodiversity or
conservation. It has been the pervasive conflation of individual organisms with species that
has led to the misconception that species are discernible things and the principle objects of
interest. The second consequence is that supraspecific hypotheses are not epistemically
equivalent to specific hypotheses, thus negating the notion of taxonomic surrogacy [26, cf.
references therein promoting its use; also referred to as ‘taxonomic sufficiency,’ e.g. 120‒123;
not to be confused with ‘surrogacy’ as applied in conservation, cf. 32]. These are distinct classes
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of hypotheses inferred from different sets of theories [12‒14]. Similarly, supraspecific hypoth‐
eses assigned the same rank are not epistemically equivalent relative to hypotheses of other
ranks [12, 26, 120; contra 124]. Viewed from the perspective of cladograms, there are no
objective criteria for selectively assigning some taxa formal, ranked names to the exclusion of
remaining hypotheses implied by those cladograms. Lacking such equivalence is the strongest
argument against the use of taxonomic surrogacy, at least with regard to supraspecific taxa
serving as representations of species.
Causal questions: Relations: Represented by:
“Why do I have these sense
perceptions?”
Perceptual hypothesis –
An individual exists.
Observation statement
“Why does this individual have character
X at time t 2 in contrast to Y at t 1?”
Ontogenetic hypothesis –
This individual has character X at time t 2
because it is part of the ontogenetic
trajectory.
Semaphoront names, e.g.
“embryo,” “larva,” “adult”
“Why are these individuals observed at
this location in contrast to some other
location?”
“Why does this individual, or individuals,
have character X in contrast to Y?”
Tokogenetic hypothesis –
Individuals are at this location because they
are products of past tokogenetic events
among other individuals.
This individual, or individuals, has character X
because the genetic capacity to exhibit the
character was passed on from their parent(s).
Families, demes, populations,
communities, etc.
“Why do individuals to which species
hypothesis x-us refers have either
character X or Y in contrast to only
character X observed among other
individuals?”
“Intraspecific” hypothesis –
The reproductively isolated population is
polymorphic because character Y originated
in the population, such that observed
individuals with X and Y are products of past
tokogenetic events among individuals with
those characters.
Polymorphism
“Why do these individuals have
character X in contrast to character Y
observed among individuals to which
other species hypotheses have been
applied?”
Species 1 hypothesis – character origin, with
subsequent fixation via tokogeny by sexual
reproductive events. Individuals have
character X because it originated among
individuals with character Y, and X eventually
became fixed throughout the population,
such that individuals observed in the present
are products of past sexual-based
tokogenetic events involving individuals with
that character.
Species sensu lato names
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Causal questions: Relations: Represented by:
Species2 hypothesis – simultaneous character
origin/fixation via tokogeny by sexual
reproductive events, i.e. hybridization,
polyploidy. Individuals have character X
because it immediately originated as a
consequence of hybridization, such that
individuals observed in the present are
products of past sexual-based tokogenetic
events involving hybrid individuals with that
character.
Species3 hypothesis – simultaneous character
origin/fixation, with subsequent tokogeny by
asexual, apomictic/ parthenogenetic, or self-
fertilizing hermaphroditic reproductive
events.
Individuals have character X because it
originated in an individual, such that
individuals observed in the present are
products of subsequent past asexual-,
apomictic- / parthenogenetic-, or self-
fertilizing-based tokogenetic events derived
from that original individual.
Species4 hypothesis – character origin, with
subsequent fixation via tokogeny by
alternations of sexual and asexual
reproductive events. Individuals have
character X because it originated among
individuals with character Y, and X eventually
became fixed throughout the population,
such that individuals observed in the present
are products of past alternating sexual and
asexual tokogenetic events involving
individuals with that character.
Species 5 hypothesis – immediate character
origin/fixation via horizontal genetic
exchange. Individuals have character X
because it immediately originated in an
individual from a horizontal genetic
exchange event, such that individuals
observed in the present are products of
subsequent past asexual-based tokogenetic
events derived from that original individual.
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Causal questions: Relations: Represented by:
“Why do these individuals, to which
species hypotheses a-us and b-us refer,
have character X in contrast to character
Y?” (applicable to gonochoristic or cross-
fertilizing hermaphroditic organisms)
Phylogenetic hypothesis –
Individuals have character X because this
character originated within a population
with character Y, and X eventually became
fixed throughout the population, and there
was subsequent splitting of that population
into two or more populations.
Supraspecific names
Table 1. Comparisons of hypotheses commonly encountered in biological systematics (modified from [12]). Note that
within what has traditionally been considered the scope of species it is necessary to distinguish five different sets of
causal events that account for shared features. See Figure 1 for graphic representations of each hypothesis (only
‘species1’ hypotheses shown).
3. Inferences of taxa
The previous section outlined the link between biological systematics hypotheses, colloquially
known as taxa, and what exists in the form of observed organisms with properties explained
by those hypotheses (Table 1, Fig. 1). As the principle goal in all fields of science is the
acquisition of causal understanding, the inferential relations in systematics that span our
observation statements and explanatory hypotheses can be summarized as follows:
[A]
a. organisms, as objects, are perceived as a matter of the properties they instantiate;
b. as consequences of perceptions in (a), represented by our causal questions, the focal point
of biology is individual organisms (semaphoronts), or parts or remnants of organisms
(Table 1);
c. there are a variety of explanatory hypotheses that serve as answers to questions in (b)
regarding perceptions of organisms; the following classes of hypotheses are common in
systematics and other biological fields (Table 1; Fig. 1):
i. ontogenetic (via semaphoronts)
ii. tokogenetic
iii. intraspecific/polymorphic
iv. specific (species) sensu lato (cf. Table 1)
v. phylogenetic;
d. the goal of inferring the hypotheses in (c) is to provide at least preliminary explanatory
accounts of differentially distributed properties observed among semaphoronts.
It is from these inferential relations that implications can be identified for considerations of
intraspecific/polymorphic, specific, and phylogenetic hypotheses for biodiversity and conser‐
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vation. Notice that each class of explanatory hypothesis in [A](c) has as its basis particular
properties of organisms (Table 1). Each type of hypothesis serves to address a subset of the
totality of properties one perceives, and as such, hypotheses inferred from different causal
theories are not epistemically equivalent [12, 13]. These conditions present consequences for
the view that taxa, no matter the rank, are the relevant subjects in the definitions or discussions
of biodiversity and conservation.
The inferential links between our perceptions of organisms and conclusions in the form of taxa
[cf. [A](c)] have been analyzed by Fitzhugh [10, 12‒14, 37, 97, 98, 109, 125, 126], thus only brief‐
ly described here. The process of reasoning from observed effects, in this case the properties of
organisms, to explanatory hypotheses (taxa) is known as abduction or abductive inference
[127‒154; cf. 10‒13, 37, 97, 98, 109, 125, 126 for considerations of abduction in relation to biolog‐
ical systematics and evolutionary biology]. Abduction can be schematically represented as:
[B]
• auxiliary theory(ies)/hypotheses
• theory(ies) relevant to perceived effects
• perceived effects
• therefore, explanatory hypothesis
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representations of two specific hypotheses (cf. Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’ ‘species4’), indi‐
cating (a) origins and (b) fixation of the respective properties of gray and black body walls, with (c) subsequent tokog‐
eny resulting individuals observed in the present.
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While a form of non-deductive inference, abduction is distinct from induction sensu stricto,
which entails the process of hypothesis testing, contra [155]. Deduction provides for stipulating
potential test evidence.
Consider the example in Figure 2. Specimens are observed with the unexpected or surprising
properties of either gray or black bodies. It is the nature of these observations that prompts the
implicit or explicit causal questions of why these properties are present among individuals in
contrast to what has been previously observed (and expected). Specific hypotheses a-us and
b-us1 provide respective explanatory accounts of the observations. The theory used for the
purposes of inferring these hypotheses would have the form described by Fitzhugh [12, 13;
see also 37]:
[C]
If property Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c... n among gonochoristic [partim] or cross-
fertilizing hermaphroditic individuals of a reproductively isolated population with character
X, and Y subsequently becomes fixed throughout the population during tokogeny by mech‐
anisms d, e, f... n, then individuals observed in the present will exhibit Y.
The basis for giving the label ‘species’ to these hypotheses is contingent on the same theory
being applied to particular features, which is consistent with the formal definition of species
offered by Fitzhugh [13: p207]:
[D]
An explanatory account of the occurrences of the same character(s) among gonochoristic or
cross-fertilizing hermaphroditic individuals by way of character origin and subsequent
fixation during tokogeny.
Given the theory in [C] and definition in [D], Fitzhugh [13] pointed out that specific-level
hypotheses cannot be applied to organisms with obligate asexual, parthenogenetic, or self-
fertilizing hermaphroditic reproductive strategies, suggesting that causal accountings appli‐
cable to such individuals would be akin to phylogenetic hypotheses (cf. [G], [H]); not to be
confused with the ‘phylogenetic species concept’ [6, 156, 157; cf. 158]. The situation is, however,
more complex as is apparent in Table 1. At least five sets of general causal conditions are
subsumed under species sensu lato—‘species1’ through ‘species5’. Contrary to Fitzhugh’s [13]
suggestion, it would be more accurate to regard ‘species3’ (asexual, apomictic/parthenogenetic,
self-fertilizing hermaphroditic hypotheses) and ‘species5’ (horizontal genetic exchange
hypotheses; [159‒163]) distinct from phylogenetic hypotheses since the causal events entailed
by the latter involve character origin/fixation as part of tokogeny that is to some extent sexual-
based interbreeding, with subsequent population splitting (cf. [H]). The remaining classes of
hypotheses, ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’ and ‘species4,’ refer to causal events among individuals to
which phylogenetic hypotheses also apply. While the definition of species by Fitzhugh ([13];
1 I have intentionally avoided using the binomial arrangement of genus and specific epithet to denote specific hypotheses. As
supraspecific (= phylogenetic) hypotheses are the products of inferential acts that are separate from inferences of specific hypotheses
(Table 1), it can be argued that there should be no requirement that formal recognition of a specific hypothesis be made in conjunction
with any phylogenetic (= genus ranked) hypothesis [12, 14, 104, 105].
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cf. [D]) satisfies the requirement of limiting specific hypotheses to obligate sexual-based
interbreeding (‘species1,’ ‘species2’), this definition can be extended to organisms with more
complex life histories involving combinations of asexual and sexual reproductive events
(‘species4’).
Two alternative strategies might be considered for handling the five connotations of species
in Table 1. Either approach might appear unorthodox, but what we save by holding to tradition
comes at the expense of precisely conveying hypotheses and accurately representing biodi‐
versity and conservation. What is apparent is that effective communication of a multitude of
causal events represented in systematics hypotheses cannot be accomplished with the one
term, species. The more radical approach would be to limit specific hypotheses to ‘species1,’ via
the theory in [C], while referring to ‘species2-5,’ as inferential products of four additional
theories:
[E]
a. species theory (‘species1’): See [C]; phylogenetic hypotheses, sensu [H], are also applicable
to individuals to which such specific hypotheses apply;
b. interspecific hybrid theory (‘species2’): if property Y simultaneously originates and is fixed
by hybridization, e.g. polyploidy, among gonochoristic or cross-fertilizing hermaphro‐
ditic individuals to which respective ‘species1’ hypotheses refer, such that subsequent
tokogeny is limited to individuals with Y, then individuals observed in the present will
exhibit Y; phylogenetic hypotheses, sensu [H], are also applicable to individuals to which
such specific hypotheses apply;
c. asexual-autogamic theory (‘species3’): if character X exists among individuals with obligate
reproduction that is asexual, apomictic/parthenogenetic, or self-fertilizing, and character
Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c… n, during tokogeny, then individuals observed in the
present exhibiting X and Y are respective tokogenetic products of individuals with those
characters [13: p210]; phylogenetic hypotheses are not applicable to individuals to which
such specific hypotheses apply;
d. asexual-sexual theory (‘species4’): if property Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c... n among
individuals with X during one of the alternative phases of asexual or sexual tokogenetic
events, and Y subsequently becomes fixed throughout the population during tokogeny
by mechanisms d, e, f... n, then individuals observed in the present will exhibit Y; phylo‐
genetic hypotheses, sensu [H], are also applicable to individuals to which such specific
hypotheses apply;
e. horizontal genetic exchange theory (‘species5’): if character X exists among individuals and
character Y subsequently occurs by horizontal genetic exchange mechanisms d, e, f... n
with other individuals, then individuals observed in the present exhibiting X and Y are
respective tokogenetic products of individuals with those characters.
A more conservative approach entails using the specific theory and definition in [C]  and
[D],  respectively,  to  broadly  accommodate  ‘species1,’  ‘species2,’  and  ‘species4.’  ‘Species3’
and ‘species5’ remain classes of explanatory accounts among organisms that cannot be co‐
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ordinately accommodated by either specific sensu stricto  (cf. [D]) or phylogenetic (cf. [G],
[H]) hypotheses and both types of hypotheses would require new, separate formal names
distinct from the rank of species. Acknowledging theories [E](c) and (e) for ‘species3’ and
‘species5,’  respectively,  makes  apparent  the  importance  of  the  suggestions  offered  here:
the applications of these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive for obligate asex‐
ually reproducing individuals [80, 159, 163‒166]. The solution to conveying both classes of
events must be by way of taxon names distinct from the one term ‘species.’ No doubt ex‐
ceptions to the theories in [E]  can be pointed to.  Rather than intended as an exhaustive
list, the objective here is to recognize that protocols need to be pursued for accommodat‐
ing a variety of classes of events to be communicated in a manner more effective than un‐
der the one heading, ‘species.’
Applying the specific theory in [C] or [E](a) to the observations in Figure 2, the inference can
be summarized as follows:
[F]
Theory: If property Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c... n among gonochoristic or cross-
fertilizing hermaphroditic individuals of a reproductively isolated population with character
X, and Y subsequently becomes fixed throughout the population during tokogeny by mech‐
anisms d, e, f... n, then individuals observed in the present will exhibit Y.
Observed effects: Individuals have gray bodies, in contrast to white or black.
Therefore, explanatory hypothesis (species taxon a-us, cf. Fig. 2): The gray character arose
in a reproductively isolated population of white individuals, and the gray condition subse‐
quently became fixed throughout the population during tokogeny, leading to gray individuals
observed in the present.
While this inference pertains to ‘species1’ hypotheses, there are several aspects that can be
extended to all of the classes of hypotheses in Table 1 that are inferred from theories in [E], and
will also figure prominently in the definitions of biodiversity and conservation presented later.
Note that individuals observed in the present are products of proximate instances of tokogeny
(Fig. 2c). Regardless of whether these tokogenetic events occurred subsequent to the origin
(Fig. 2a) and fixation (Fig. 2b) of the character to which the hypothesis refers, or were contem‐
poraneous with either of those events, observed individuals are products of tokogeny. What
will be shown later regarding proximate tokogeny is that specific sensu lato as well as supra‐
specific taxa (phylogenetic hypotheses) are only tangentially relevant to biodiversity and
conservation. Specific- and phylogenetic-level taxa serve as surrogates, referring to separate,
hypothesized proximate systems of tokogeny (Fig. 2c) that are used to denote biodiversity. But
in the case of conservation, taxa are largely irrelevant, as the scope of the act of conservation
is potential processes of tokogeny into the future, not the maintenance of intraspecific, specific,
or supraspecific taxa (Fig. 1, Table 1). Taxa cannot be conserved because they are not spatio-
temporally restricted things – they are explanatory constructs only relevant to observed
organisms.
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Figure 3. a) Cladogram schematically summarizing hypothesized causal events. (b) List of all hypotheses indicated in
the cladogram in (a).
Consider next the example in Figure 3a. Presented as a cladogram, phylogenetic hypothesis
X-us implies that the property gray originated and became fixed among individuals as a result
of an unspecified causal event(s), subsequent to which was a population splitting event, the
specifics of which are also not indicated in the diagram. Y-us, on the other hand, entails that
the character black originated and became fixed, subsequent to which were a series of
population splitting events, to which other unspecified hypotheses refer. Unlike the previous
example of inferences of specific hypotheses a-us and b-us (cf. [F], Fig. 2), phylogenetic
hypotheses X-us and Y-us are derived from a phylogenetic theory; somewhat different from
the theory used to infer a-us and b-us (cf. Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’ ‘species4,’ [E](a), (b),
(d); [10, 12‒14, 37, 98, 126]):
[G]2
If character X exists among individuals of a reproductively isolated, gonochoristic or cross-
fertilizing hermaphroditic population and character Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c... n,
and becomes fixed within the population by mechanisms d, e, f... n [= ancestral species
hypothesis], followed by event or events g, h, i... n, wherein the population is divided into two
or more reproductively isolated populations, then individuals to which descendant species
hypotheses refer would exhibit Y.
The abductive inference of hypothesis Y-us, for instance, would have the form:
[H]
Theory: If character X exists among individuals of a reproductively isolated, gonochoristic or
cross-fertilizing hermaphroditic population and character Y originates by mechanisms a, b, c...
n, and becomes fixed within the population by mechanisms d, e, f... n [= ancestral species
hypothesis], followed by event or events g, h, i... n, wherein the population is divided into two
or more reproductively isolated populations, then individuals to which descendant species
hypotheses refer would exhibit Y.
2 While this ‘phylogenetic theory’ offers a common cause accounting, it actually refers to two classes of common cause
events: character origin/fixation (applied to each set of shared characters) and population splitting. The implementation
of the theory in [H] obviates Sober’s [167: p157] view that phylogenetic inference is a two-step process, i.e. “The first
problem is… one infers a tree;… one uses an inferred tree to solve a further problem [of ancestral character transforma‐
tion].”
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Observed effects: Individuals to which species hypotheses c-us, d-us, e-us, and f-us refer have
black bodies, in contrast to white or gray.
Therefore, explanatory hypothesis (supraspecific taxon Y-us, cf. Fig. 3a): The black character
among individuals to which species hypotheses c-us, d-us, e-us, and f-us refer arose in a
reproductively isolated population of white individuals, and the black condition subsequently
became fixed throughout the population during tokogeny, followed by three events of
population splitting to produce isolated populations to which descendant species hypotheses
refer (c-us, d-us, e-us, f-us).
Note that the cladogram in Figure 3a refers to two classes of hypotheses – specific (sensu
stricto; [F]) and phylogenetic. Of these, eight (six specific, two phylogenetic) are formally
named, while two phylogenetic hypotheses are unnamed (Fig. 3b), i.e. (d-us, e-us, f-us) and (e-
us, f-us). Acknowledging the presence of these latter, unnamed hypotheses highlights the
erroneous view that supraspecific hypotheses can serve as ‘taxonomic surrogates’ for specific
hypotheses. Supraspecific taxa invariably subsume any number of less general phylogenetic
hypotheses, such that attempts to treat formally named hypotheses as surrogates for specific
hypotheses is not only arbitrary at the level of phylogenetic hypothesis selection, but also
arbitrary with regard to only focusing on the one class of systematics hypothesis called species
(cf. Fig. 1, Table 1).
The inference in [H] would typically be said, albeit erroneously, to be a ‘parsimony’ approach
(cf. [167‒169]), in contrast to implementations of either maximum likelihood or Bayesianism
(cf. [170‒ 172]). Parsimony and likelihood cannot, however, be treated as separate concepts in
abduction [10, 14]. So-called maximum likelihood methods require the assumption that one’s
observation statements regarding shared characters are inconsistent with the causal questions
to be asked in relation to explaining those observations, given that a cladogram subsumes a
series of incomplete explanatory hypotheses that take ‘branch length’ into consideration. By
extension, likelihood methods utilize theories that are not necessarily common cause theories
(cf. [G]) because rates of change are involved. Strictly speaking, using a rate-based theory
applies to tokogenetic-, not phylogenetic-level phenomena. The consequence is that the scope
of such inferences moves from being phylogenetic to either specific, polymorphic, or intra‐
specific/tokogenetic [10, 13, 14]. As noted by Cleland ([173: p572, emphasis original; see also
174‒177]),
“The scientifically most fruitful common cause explanations appeal to last (proximate)
common causes. A last common cause represents the causal juncture at which the items in the
collection cease to share a more recent common cause. Because they maximize causal unity
last common cause explanations have greater explanatory power than other common cause
explanations.”
Bayesianism, on the other hand, addresses changes in hypothesis belief relative to test evidence
(contra e.g. [178‒180]). Bayes’ Theorem has no role to play in abductive inference for the fact
that character data, as the basis for inferring phylogenetic hypotheses, cannot in turn be used
to test those hypotheses [10, 14, 126].
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4. Defining biodiversity and conservation
Most of the definitions of biodiversity cited in the Introduction make reference to three
qualities: genomes, species, and ecosystems. Noss [22: p356] included an additional dimension,
claiming that “Biodiversity is not simply the number of genes, species, ecosystems, or any
other group of things [sic] in a defined area... Ecologists usually define ‘diversity’ in a way that
takes into consideration the relative frequency or abundance of each species or other entity, in
addition to the number of entities in the collection.” But as taxa are explanatory hypotheses
rather than objects, Noss commits the common mistake (cf. [9]) of conflating species with
individual organisms. As shown in Figures 1‒2, [A], [F], and Table 1, individuals (represented/
communicated by observation statements) and species are separate subjects produced from
different inferential actions. Noss [22: p356, fig.1] further states there are “three primary
attributes of ecosystems: composition, structure, and function,” and within each are interde‐
pendent, internested relationships (Fig. 4). Interdependence, much less hierarchical organiza‐
tion is at best dubious. For instance, ‘genes,’ if one assumes this to mean a discrete sequence
of nucleotides, are not dependent upon ‘genetic structure’ and ‘genetic processes.’ The latter
two are dependent on the presence of genes, as properties of organisms, not vice versa. Given
what was discussed earlier regarding individual organisms as the focal point of observations
in biology, we need only consider the compositional aspects in Figure 4, where the hierarchy
includes genes, populations, and species. A key question to ask is whether or not any of these
actually match what we perceive. Species sensu lato (Table 1, [E]) are explanatory hypotheses,
not individuals, entities, or things. While a sequence of nucleotides can be indirectly discerned,
they are only referred to as genes because of the functional role they play in causal processes
during the life (ontogeny) of an organism. Sequences, as opposed to functional units qua genes,
are properties of organisms. A population is a group of individuals, and speaking of that group
is by way of one’s perceptions of individual organisms, and perhaps by extension past causal
relations (Fig. 1, Table 1). There are no applicable emergent properties of a population one
might perceive that are not manifestations of the component organisms of that population or
their collective actions. The biological components that can be perceived in the more inclusive
concepts shown in Figure 4, communities/ecosystems and landscape types, are individual
organisms. Biodiversity could not have as its focus genes, species, or populations. The
pertinent functional subjects are individual organisms. If we are to characterize a concept of
biodiversity, it must be in terms of the tangible aspects of organisms, i.e. their intrinsic
properties, that provide the basis for making relational statements about spatially or tempo‐
rally different areas as consequences of the range of inferences in [A](c) (Table 1, Fig. 1). By
their very nature, specific-level hypotheses – indeed all taxa – do not represent the totality of
what is perceived of organisms. This is apparent from what is shown in Table 1, Figures 1‒2,
and [A](c). Different classes of biological systematics hypotheses provide answers to causal
questions addressing any number of different classes of properties among organisms. To limit
a conception of biodiversity to species [sic] would not only be to deny the explanatory relevance
of other hypotheses used to account for other organismal properties, but also arbitrary.
Circumventing this problem requires orienting focus away from species, to individual
organisms and the properties they instantiate.
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Figure 4. The three principle attributes of biodiversity according to Noss [22: fig.1], compositional, structural, and
functional, and the hierarchical arrangements of components within each.
In contrast to the three-part hierarchies of Noss [22], Sarkar [32] suggested that among the enti‐
ties [sic] considered in biodiversity and conservation, two hierarchies are used: spatial and
taxonomic. The spatial hierarchy entails molecules, cell organelles, cells, individuals, popula‐
tions, communities, and ecosystems. The taxonomic hierarchy contains alleles, linkage groups,
genotypes, subspecies, species, genera, families, orders, classes, phyla, and kingdoms. While
Sarkar’s spatial hierarchy conveys part-whole relations, the taxonomic hierarchy is a mix of
part-cum-function and explanatory hypotheses. As noted in the previous paragraph, such a ‘hi‐
erarchy’ fails for the fact that it does not contain entities to which biodiversity and conservation
can refer.
If there is no epistemic basis for restricting a definition of biodiversity to genes, species sensu
lato, or other taxa, and the objects of our observation statements are individual organisms, to
what does biodiversity refer? Sarkar [32] is correct in pointing out that the answer is contingent
upon identifying what is being conserved. If conservation is the act of conserving something,
and that something is conveyed by the term biodiversity, then clearly we are not conserving
specific or supraspecific taxa sensu [F] and [H] (Figs. 1‒3, Table 1), or any taxon for that matter.
Taxa are explanatory accounts, as inferential reactions to our observations of organisms,
providing understanding of relevant features by way of past causal processes. Taxa are not
tangible qualities existing in the present to which conservation efforts can be applied into the
future. But it can be argued that there is a relation between conservation and taxa that allows
for a cogent and operational definition of biodiversity – exemplifying the transitive relations
between taxa, biodiversity, and conservation, and solidifying the status of species, regardless
of connotation, as explanatory hypotheses. Recall the inferences of specific hypotheses in [F]
(Fig. 2). It was noted that while such hypotheses have causal components that include character
origin and fixation, the hypotheses also imply that individuals are products of proximate
events of tokogeny (Fig. 2c). Per a given specific hypothesis, those proximate tokogenetic
events would be separate from other such sets of tokogeny outlined by other specific hypoth‐
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eses. Similarly, since the phylogenetic inference in [H] (Fig. 3a) entails separately-inferred
specific hypotheses (cf. [F], Fig. 2), the ‘terminal branches’ of the cladogram imply the same
sets of proximate tokogenetic events. In point of fact, as exemplified in Figure 1 (Table 1),
proximate tokogenetic events are components of not only specific and phylogenetic hypoth‐
eses but also intraspecific/polymorphic, and cyclomorphic hypotheses.
Figure 5. Schematic representation of relations between observed organisms, taxa, biodiversity, and conservation.
Formal definitions of biodiversity and conservation are provided. Note that explanatory hypotheses referred to as taxa
will be of different forms depending on the questions to which those hypotheses serve as answers (cf. Table 1, Figure
1). Yet, biodiversity and conservation focus on future tokogenetic events, regardless of the taxon used (cf. Figs. 3–5).
Taxa serve as surrogates to denote the geographic scope of individuals to which biodiversity refers, and conservation
is to be applied. Hypotheses regarding obligate asexual, apomictic/parthenogenetic, or self-fertilizing hermaphroditic
tokogeny, or horizontal genetic transfer (cf. Table 1: ‘species3,’ ‘species5’) can be conveyed in the same type of dia‐
gram
Identifying temporally proximate tokogenetic events as components of most (ontogenetic
excluded) classes of hypotheses in systematics provides not only the basis for defining
biodiversity, but furnishes the relevant conceptual link to conservation – again illustrating the
transitive relations between taxa, biodiversity, and conservation. Defining biodiversity can be
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accomplished by illustrating the relations between taxa (qua sets of proximate tokogenetic
events), organisms existing in the present, and conservation. These relations are schematized
in Figure 5. Given our observations of organisms in the present, we abductively infer explan‐
atory hypotheses referred to as taxa. Based on what was described earlier, a formal definition
of taxon would be (cf. [12, 13]):
[I]
Taxon: A class of explanatory hypotheses in biological systematics, causally accounting for
particular characters of observed organisms.
Contrary to what was suggested by Wilkins ([90: p146; see also [89]), taxa are not “phenomena
that call for a theoretical explanation.” Taxa are the explanations. The phenomena to which
they refer are organisms with differentially shared characters. Regarding intraspecific/
polymorphic, specific sensu lato, and phylogenetic taxa, all of these hypotheses entail proximate
tokogeny (Figs. 1, 5a). But taxa, inclusive of hypothesized proximate tokogenetic events, are
not the actual objects of concern. Biodiversity cannot be characterized in terms of taxa
simpliciter. Rather, biodiversity is best conceived as a metaphor, relating a circumscribed,
contemporaneous group of organisms (Fig. 5b) to taxa, insofar as taxa serve as surrogates for
proximate tokogeny (e.g. Fig. 2c). A formal definition of biodiversity would then be:
[J]
Biodiversity: A metaphor for groups of organisms in a delimited geographic region, for which
taxa serve as surrogates for sets of proximate tokogenetic events, such that similar, potential
future tokogenetic events can be conserved.
The definition allows for making rational decisions about what taxa serve as surrogates.
Depending on the spatial scope of organisms under consideration, biodiversity cannot be
strictly equated with just species or phylogenetic hypotheses (cf. ‘phylogenetic diversity,’ [107,
181‒185]). That one speaks of biodiversity is first contingent upon observations of organisms
by way of the properties they instantiate, followed by abductive inferences to hypotheses that
account for certain of those properties, in part as matters of past tokogeny. Associated with
reference to proximate tokogeny, itself a taxon (Fig. 1, Table 1), the definition of biodiversity
in [J] has its greatest strength in providing an operational relation to conservation. The most
tangible aspect of biodiversity as defined here is that it is either prompted by considerations
of conservation or is the unambiguous concept to which conservation is directed, which is
consistent with the perspective offered by Sarkar [32]. In terms of proceeding from the present
– with observations of organisms in given areas – into the future, what are to be conserved are
conditions offering the greatest potential for tokogenetic events like those referred to or
implied by taxa (Fig. 5c). Regarding biodiversity as sets of tokogenetic systems is then
consistent with this definition of conservation:
[K]
Conservation: Actions in a delimited geographic region that afford conditions for continued
tokogeny into the future, among organisms to which specified taxa apply.
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The intent of conservation is to enable future events of tokogeny among individuals, not to
conserve taxa. To reiterate, taxa are inferential reactions to observations of individuals,
indicating relevant past causal events accounting for particular organismal properties. It is
epistemically meaningless to say conservation seeks to maintain explanatory hypotheses or
taxa, especially since those hypotheses only have relevance to effects observed in the present,
as individual organisms, not potential causal events among future individuals. But this error
is the case when one suggests, for instance, that a habitat should be maintained as part of an
effort to conserve particular species. Beyond correctly characterizing the nature and role of
taxa, the utility of the definitions in [J] and [K] is that they are fully operational in relation to
those taxa that would serve as relevant surrogates for biodiversity (Fig. 1, Table 1). Generalized
examples of application, derived from Figure 5, are provided next.
Figure 6. Example of the relations between observed individuals to which an intraspecific hypothesis is applied (cf.
Figs. 1–2, Table 1), and biodiversity and conservation. See Figure 5 and text for additional explanation.
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Speaking  of  intraspecific/polymorphic  variation  within  a  population  implies  past  causal
events of character origin [Fig. 6a(i)] and incomplete fixation [Fig. 6a(ii)] as accounting for ob‐
served conditions. Biodiversity within the present population is a matter of referring to varia‐
tion or polymorphism as results of recent tokogeny (Fig. 6b).  By extension, conservation
involves actions that allow for continued tokogeny that might ensure the properties of individ‐
uals to which biodiversity refers (Fig. 6c). The consideration of biodiversity in terms of specif‐
ic sensu stricto taxa as surrogates is essentially identical (Fig. 7). Biodiversity in relation to
supraspecific taxa (Fig. 8), i.e. phylogenetic hypotheses, is similar to the two previous exam‐
ples, once again indicating that biodiversity and conservation pertain to tokogeny, not species
sensu stricto (i.e. ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’ ‘species4’) or supraspecific taxa. Referring to supraspecif‐
ic taxa (Fig. 8a) in the context of biodiversity necessitates considering specific hypotheses (Fig.
8b), since it is the latter that entail the relevant proximate sets of tokogenetic systems. Conser‐
vation then pertains to maintaining the continuity of those sets of tokogenetic systems into the
future (Fig. 8c).
Figure 7. Example of the relations between observed individuals to which a species hypothesis is applied (cf. Figs. 1–2,
Table 1), and biodiversity and conservation. See Figure 5 and text for additional explanation.
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Figure 8. Example of the relations between observed individuals to which a phylogenetic hypothesis is applied (cf.
Figs. 1–2, Table 1), and biodiversity and conservation. See text for additional explanation.
5. Discussion
The crux of the analysis presented in this chapter is that defining species (including taxa),
biodiversity, and conservation are best approached from the perspective of the transitive relations
between the concepts to which each of these terms refers. Recognizing these relations follows
from the pursuit of causal understanding that is not only the goal of science in general but also
the subfield known as systematics. But instead of limiting the question to “What are species?”,
it has been shown that the more relevant question is, “What are taxa?” If species are taxa, then
species have a standing no more and no less epistemically important than what are accorded
other taxa. The consequences of answering the two questions can be summarized as follows:
(1) at best, species [Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’‘species4’; [E](a), (b), (d)] is a class of systematics
hypotheses applied to those organisms among which to some extent there is obligate genetic
exchange by way of tokogenetic-based sexual reproductive events; the matter of other causal
events to which species have been referred, i.e. ‘species3’ and ‘species5’ (Table 1, [E](c), (e)]),
require separate consideration; (2) biodiversity is a rhetorical device indicating relations
between observed organisms and hypothesized sets of past sexual or asexual proximate
tokogeny, not limited to species sensu lato, inferred from characters of organisms (cf. [J]); and
(3) conservation is a reaction to the metaphor of biodiversity, in the form of actions that promote
tokogeny into the future (cf. [K]).
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In the context of taxa as explanatory hypotheses, as reactions to our observations of organisms,
the scope of species in biology is in need of revision. Consider the insightful treatment by
Wilkins [8]3. Among the 26 ‘species concepts’ identified by Wilkins [6], Wilkins [8: p58,
emphasis original] suggests there are “seven ‘basic’ species concepts:”
“…agamospecies (asexuals), biospecies (reproductively isolated sexual species), ecospecies (ecological niche occupiers),
evolutionary species (evolving lineages), genetic species (common gene pool), morphospecies (species defined by their form,
or phenotypes), and taxonomic species (whatever a taxonomist calls a species).”
Wilkins segregates morphospecies and taxonomic species as focusing on “how we identify
species,” whereas remaining concepts refer to “what species are.” It is among these latter ‘basic’
concepts that Wilkins [8: p59] narrows the distinction to “ecospecies” and “biospecies.” But
he regards ecospecies and biospecies as referring not to a concept of species but rather causes
of species. In other words, they are explanatory accounts. Wilkins [8: p59] (see also [89]) raises
the important point that “Theory-based [species] concepts presume the universal applicability
of that theory outside the groups on which it was formulated…. Discovery techniques [sic]
that are based on explanatory concepts are hostage to empirical fortune.” To that end, he
suggests that species be defined as “those groups of organisms that resemble their parents.”
As a necessity borne out of the need to subsume asexual- and sexual-based tokogeny and
horizontal genetic exchange under the one term species, this definition is reduced to being
largely equivalent to tokogeny (cf. Fig. 1, Table 1). Notice also that Wilkins’ definition is imbued
with causal content. As all taxa refer to explanatory accounts, tokogeny already serves that
role in a capacity that is more restricted relative to species. But to say “explanatory concepts
are hostage to empirical fortune,” cannot be regarded as a negative consequence. At best, it is
nothing more than acknowledging that conclusions of all abductive inferences, from obser‐
vation statements to taxa, are never theory neutral. To think that systematics should be
divorced from considerations of explanation is contrary to the very objective of scientific
inquiry. Rather than attempting to reduce the definition of species to that of tokogeny, we need
to face the issue that the one term species has been given the unrealistic task of encompassing
a spectrum of causal conditions intended to account for select properties of organisms ([E],
Table 1). Since it is our observations of properties of organisms that compel our inferential
actions leading to the explanatory conclusions we call taxa, the challenge with respect to
species is straightforward. We need to limit the scope of specific hypotheses to the explanatory
realm of character origin/fixation within reproductively isolated populations of organisms
with obligate, albeit not exclusive, sexual reproduction (i.e. [C]; Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’
‘species4’), and recognize other classes of hypotheses-as-taxa when speaking of organisms that
are strictly asexual, apomictic/parthenogenetic, self-fertilizing hermaphroditic, or engage in
horizontal genetic exchange ([E], Table 1: ‘species3,’ ‘species5’). With respect to obligate asexual,
3 It should be noted that Wilkins (pers. comm.) does not subscribe to the view that species are explanatory hypotheses.
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apomictic/parthenogenetic, or self-fertilizing hermaphroditic organisms, or events of hori‐
zontal genetic exchange, neither specific sensu stricto nor phylogenetic hypotheses apply in the
capacity required for sexually-reproducing organisms.
The concerns expressed above regarding parsing the various classes of hypotheses we call taxa
brings to light significant consequences for considerations of biodiversity and conservation.
That biodiversity is a metaphor is a consequence of our reliance on intraspecific/polymorphic,
specific, and phylogenetic hypotheses serving as surrogates for hypotheses of proximate
tokogeny (Fig. 5). It is the continuation of tokogenetic events, asexual or sexual, that conser‐
vation seeks to preserve. The inherent constraints imposed by the nature of taxa as explanatory
hypotheses determine these characterizations. The most notable outcome is that the relevance
of species to biodiversity and conservation is both diminished and placed in proper perspective
with all other taxa. The definition of biodiversity in [J] is thus at odds with the more standard
view that biodiversity is a hierarchy of ‘things,’ e.g. genes, species/taxa, ecosystems, in need
of conservation. For instance, Margules et al. [19: p310] state that,
“The concept of biodiversity encompasses the entire biological hierarchy from molecules to
ecosystems. It includes entities [sic] recognisable at each level (genes, taxa, communities, etc.)
and the interactions between them (nutrient and energy cycling, predation, competition,
mutation, and adaptation, etc.). These entities are heterogeneous, meaning that all members
at each level can be distinguished from one another; they form a hierarchy of nested individ‐
uals... The complete description of each level requires the inclusion of all members. The number
of viable entities at all levels is phenomenally large and in practice unknown. Yet sustaining
this variety, unknown and unmeasured, the variety of life on earth, is the goal of biodiversity
conservation. To achieve this goal it will be necessary to retain the complex hierarchical
biological organization that sustains characters within taxa, taxa within communities or
assemblages, and assemblages within ecosystems.”
Biodiversity purportedly encompasses a hierarchy of individuals, e.g. nucleotides, organisms,
taxa, communities, ecosystems, etc, and conservation is the attempt to preserve some sem‐
blance of the variety of individuals at each level. The assumption that the individuality thesis
is ontologically appropriate to taxa, communities, and ecosystems cannot be defended.
Consider the variety of hypotheses in Figure 1 (see also Table 1, Figs. 2‒3, 5‒8). What are
graphically depicted is past causal events relative to specimens observed in the present. The
totality of events entailed by any of these hypotheses does not connote individuals, things, or
‘historical entities.’ The illustrated events involved past individuals qua organisms, but the
events themselves are not individuals [12‒14, 37, 126]. None of these hypotheses present
emergent properties that would allow one the opportunity to perceive more inclusive indi‐
viduals beyond the specimens upon which the hypotheses have been inferred. The inferential
path from observation statements regarding organisms, which is contingent upon our
perceptions of the properties of those organisms, does not lead to observation statements
regarding taxa, communities, or ecosystems as individuals or entities (cf. [F], [H]). This chapter
has echoed what was recognized by Fitzhugh [10, 12–14, 37, 97, 98, 126], that taxa are conse‐
quences of our inferential actions, prompted by perceptions of individual organisms.
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With taxa acknowledged as representations of our explanatory hypotheses, it becomes
immediately apparent that we are not speaking of a hierarchy of ever-inclusive individuals
[contra 32, 186‒191]. What is critical to correctly speaking of biodiversity is that we identify the
subjects to which we are referring (Figs. 5‒8). The present analysis has provided arguments
intended to reorient the focus of biodiversity and conservation away from genes, taxa,
communities, or ecosystems as ontological individuals, to the subjects that are perceived by
biologists, i.e. organisms, and the relations of organisms to past proximate tokogeny (biodi‐
versity) and potential future tokogeny (conservation). The subjects of biodiversity and
conservation can be conceived as intersections between a multitude of fields of research,
including ecology, systematics, developmental biology, paleontology, biogeography, and
population genetics. But in each instance, taxa are not the ontologically or biologically relevant
units of interest. Our interest is in individual organisms per our inferential reactions to the
properties they instantiate, e.g. [F], [H]. Some of those reactions are communicated under the
rubric of taxa, and conveyed in the context of biodiversity. Via biodiversity, our selective
endeavors to ensure tokogeny among organisms are the acts of conservation.
Recall the quote from Noss [22: p356] given in Defining Biodiversity and Conservation, that
biodiversity is not typically considered only in terms of the number of groups of things, “the
number of genes, species, ecosystems, or any other group of things [sic] in a defined area,” but
also “the relative frequency or abundance of each species or other entity, in addition to the
number of entities in the collection.” It was noted that Noss’ characterization conflates species
with the individuals to whom those hypotheses refer. The relative abundance of hypothesized
sets of tokogenetic systems between given areas, indicated by taxa as surrogates, is not the
same as the number of individuals in those areas. The correct relation is between abundance
of individuals in an area relative to particular systematics hypotheses. But that relation would
be one predicated on biodiversity, not part of it. There is the alternative view that species
richness is an index of biodiversity. Maclaurin and Sterelny [46: p173] suggest that “Species
richness, supplemented in various ways, is a good multipurpose measure of biodiversity,
because many processes affect richness...and it is causally relevant to many outputs.” The
problem is that species richness is limited to relations with specific hypotheses, and do not
subsume explanations of observed properties of individuals denoted by other classes of taxa.
There is no epistemic basis for restricting biodiversity to species, just as conservation is not the
act of maintaining species or other taxa. Rather, biodiversity encompasses our hypotheses of
past causal events that give us at least tentative understanding of what we observe in the
present, with conservation a concerted effort to maintain opportunities for specified organ‐
isms, not species or other taxa, to continue to engage in tokogenetic events into the future. And
just as specific sensu stricto (Table 1: ‘species1,’ ‘species2,’ ‘species4’) and phylogenetic hypoth‐
eses (cf. [H]) applied to sexually reproducing organisms serve as proxies for tokogeny in both
the context of biodiversity and conservation, the taxa employed to account for properties
among obligate asexual, apomictic/parthenogenetic, or self-fertilizing hermaphroditic
organisms (Table 1: ‘species3’) and horizontal genetic exchange (Table 1: ‘species5’) also connote
surrogates for tokogeny when speaking of the biodiversity or conservation of those organisms.
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The misconception that species are the units to which biodiversity refers and conservation seek
to maintain also extends to phrases such as ‘species extinction’ or ‘endangered species.’
Extinction is not the transition from existence to non-existence of species or taxa, but rather
the cessation of reproductive events among a group of organisms. What is endangered is not
a species, but rather the opportunities for tokogeny conveyed in intraspecific/polymorphic,
specific sensu lato, or phylogenetic hypotheses, among others (cf. Table 1, Fig. 1). Orienting
focus away from the ontologically specious view that taxa are spatio-temporally restricted
things or individuals, to the relevant representations of our select, biased explanatory accounts
of what we observe of organisms provides the most effective route to ensuring the integration
of biological disciplines that go into ‘biodiversity studies’ and conservation efforts.
A final observation is in order. In conjunction with establishing that taxa are explanatory
hypotheses for particular features of organisms, and species are taxa, this chapter set out to
define the terms species/taxa, biodiversity, and conservation by acknowledging their transitive
relations, {(taxa, biodiversity), (biodiversity, conservation), (taxa, conservation)}. Pursuant to
these definitions, it is evident that these relations are not representative of our actions in
various fields of biological study. We observe individual organisms, and infer classes of
hypotheses referred to as taxa. On the basis of particular taxa, we attempt to conserve organ‐
isms and their opportunities for tokogeny into the future. Notice that it is taxa, not biodiversi‐
ty, that serves as the conceptual link. What is apparent is that biodiversity offers no tangible
contributions to our characterizations of organisms, references to taxa, or implementations of
conservation. At best biodiversity is redundant relative to taxa, at worst gratuitous for conser‐
vation (cf. Figs. 5‒8). The transitive relations that in fact exist are, {(individuals, taxa), (taxa,
conservation), (individuals, conservation)}. These revised relations manifest themselves as
follows: taxa must be determined in the context of individuals; taxa establish the limits on
conservation; individuals determine the realization of conservation. Biodiversity is an unnecessary
concept—a contrivance of unbridled reification, along the same lines of excess that have
befallen species.
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